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POOR POLICY: THE LEGACY OF THE KERNER
COMMISSION FOR SOCIAL WELFARE
DAVID STOESZ*

The legacy of the Kerner Commission 1 for poor, urban African
Americans2 isinextricably connected to the erratic development of the
nation's welfare programs. Rather than assuring basic guarantees to all
as a right of citizenship, following principles of the welfare states of

northern Europe, 3 social programs in the United States have been significantly influenced by localism, capitalism, and racism.4 IDuring the Progressive Era, African Americans created their own mutual benefit

societies when the many Charity Organization Societies that were emerging in American cities refused to assist them.' When Franklin Delano
Roosevelt consolidated many of the social programs of the New Deal in
the Social Security Act of 1935,6 agricultural and domestic workers-

most of whom were African Americans-were excluded;7 this exclusion
was a tactical concession to southern legislators. Thus, when Lyndon
Johnson declared war on poverty in the mid-1960s, many poor African
Americans who had migrated to urban areas but had not benefitted from
earlier welfare provisions stood as prospective beneficiaries.'
* Professor of Social Policy, San Diego State University School of Social Work. M.S.W.
1974, Ohio State University; D.S.W. 1980, University of Maryland. Most recently, Dr. Stoesz
was a Visiting Fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington, D.C.
1. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL ]DISORDERS (Bantam
Books 1968).
2. Editor's Note: The contributors to this symposium have used the terms "African
American," "black," and "black American," often interchangeably, in their articles. The
North Carolina Law Review has elected to defer to its contributors' choices in the absence of
any universally accepted racial or ethnic designation.
3. David Stoesz & Howard Karger, The Decline of the American WTelfare State, 26 Soc.
POL'Y & ADMIN. 3, 12 (1992).
4. For this reason historians have referred to the aggregation of American social programs as the "reluctant" welfare state or the "semiwelfare" state. See BRUCE S. JANssON,
THE RELUCTANT WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES

225-47 (1988); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE X (1986).
5. JOHN H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERI-

287-94 (5th ed. 1980).
6. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-2007 (1988
& Supp. I 1990)).
7. FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 396.
8. An anomaly in the treatment of African Americans was the brief period of the Bureau
of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (or the Freedmen's Bureau) from 1865 to 1872,
during which schools and health facilities were constructed for emancipated slaves in the
South following the Civil War. Id. at 235.
CANS
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I. THE WAR ON POVERTY
The War on Poverty was but one skirmish on a relatively wide front
of domestic initiatives. In implementing his Great Society plan, Johnson
sometimes advanced proposals of the Kennedy Administration but more
often forged boldly ahead with programs of his own. The targeting of
welfare-related social programs at the poor, as evident in the Community
Mental Health Centers Acts of 19631 and 1965,10 the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965,11 Medicaid,12 the Food Stamp Act of
1964,13 the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965,14 and

the expansion of the Manpower Development and Training Act of
1962," s significantly reinforced efforts of the anti-poverty campaign.
Thus, although public attention may have been diverted toward the
"poverty" programs, in fact much of the social legislation of the Great
Society played a supporting role in combatting poverty. The many social
programs of the Great Society, therefore, filled a void created by the New
Deal: the provision of income and services to the poor, many of whom
were African-American.
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children 16 (AFDC) program
filled another void left by the New Deal. Included in the Social Security
Act as a public assistance program, the AFDC provisions were intended
to assure income to families whose wage earners had died. 7 Since the
inception of AFDC, the makeup of the families sustained by the program
has changed considerably. By 1989, only 1.9% of families participating
in AFDC did so due to the death of a parent."8 In contrast, from 1969 to
1989 the percentage of AFDC families on the program as a result of the
absence of a parent who had "no marriage tie" increased from 27.9% to
9. Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 290 (1963) (codified as amended at scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. 111990)).
10. Community Health Services Extension Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-109, 79
Stat. 435 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West 1987 & Supp. 1991)).
11. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.A. (West 1987 & Supp. 1991)).
12. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 26 & 42 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. 111990)).
13. Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (1964) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 20112030 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991)).
14. Pub. L. No. 89-136, 79 Stat. 552 (1965) (codified as amended at scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. (1988)).
15. Pub. L. No. 87-415, 76 Stat. 23 (1962) (repealed 1973).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988 & Supp. 111990).
17. KATZ, supra note 4, at 237.
18. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS 669 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT
PROGRAMS].
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52.7%.I9 While the characteristics of AFDC families were changing
profoundly, their numbers increased dramatically. Between 1966 and
1971, the number of AFDC recipients more than doubled from less than
five million to ten million, tripling the operating cost of the program.2"
These data paralleled an emerging stereotype of welfare. The public began to view AFDC as a welfare program for poor, unmarried AfricanAmerican women and their children.
The main features of the War on Poverty, of course, consisted of the
programs enacted under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.21
Among the services to be administered through the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) were Head Start, the Job Corps, the Neighborhood
Youth Corps, Volunteers in Service to America, and the Legal Services
Program.22 Undoubtedly the most controversial aspect of the War on
Poverty was the creation of local Community Action Programs (CAPs)
which were to coordinate OEO and other social programs within poor
communities. 2 3 Minority militants seized the requirement that CAP
boards of directors reflect the "maximum feasible participation" of the
poor to confront urban power structures which were already antagonized
by OEO's practice of bypassing state and local governments in funding
CAPs.24 The wrath brought upon OEO through the hostilities generated
by CAPs in major cities led President Richard Nixon to dismantle the
agency soon thereafter. 2 5 In the process, specific War on Poverty programs were reassigned to more mainstream federal departments.
The War on Poverty bears upon the Kerner Commission in two important ways. First, the failure of the Commission to convince the Johnson administration to launch new initiatives to address mounting needs
of urban African Americans left the minority poor with little choice but
to rely on existing social programs. Thus, in the period immediately following the hot summers of the mid-1960s, the number of people eligible
for AFDC and the newer, means-tested programs of the Great Society19. Id.
20. DIANA M. DINrTTo, SOCIAL WELFARE: POLMCS AND PUBLIC POLICY 130 (3d ed.
1991).
21. Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (codified as amended at scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. 1990)).
22. Id.

23. Paul E. Peterson & J. David Greenstone, Racial Change and Citizen Participation:
The Mobilization of Low-Income Communities Through Community Action, in A DECADE OF
FEDERAL ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS: ACHIEVEMENTS, FAILURES, AND LESSONS 241, 241

(Robert E. Haveman ed., 1977).
24. The brief and volatile history of CAPs is best chronicled in DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN,
MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING 81-165 (1969).
25. Peterson & Greenstone, supra note 23, at 266.
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particularly Food Stamps and Medicaid-skyrocketed. Second, the participatory feature of the CAPs-one of the rare instances in which power
was redistributed through public policy-was retracted, and most CAPs
were disbanded. While much of the national leadership of the AfricanAmerican community would later be traced to OEO programs, the
breadth of that leadership would probably have been greater had the
CAPs continued, if only as a coordinative function in poor communities.
These factors were to prove instrumental when Ronald Reagan's administration chose to reevaluate welfare policy in the 1980s.
II.

THE REAGAN REVOLUTION

The 1970s were inauspicious for poor African Americans. The failure of the Kerner Commission to devise a comprehensive strategy for
urban minorities left them more dependent on existing, means-tested social programs. As the 1980s were to demonstrate, reliance on meanstested programs to accomplish social objectives was flawed because recipients-low-income, poorly educated, politically impotent-were relatively powerless. When conservatives in the 1970s began to indict the
means-tested programs of the War on Poverty for inducing dependency,
encouraging promiscuity, and subverting the family, poor minorities who
relied upon these programs were unable to mount a counteroffensive.
Unfortunately, during this period liberal academics who could have
stepped into this breach were dissuaded from doing so. The furor following the publication of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's report, The Negro
Family: A Casefor NationalAction26 in 1965, made it emphatically clear
to social researchers that investigations of the dysfunctional features of
African-American families would not go unchallenged. Instead, researchers were encouraged to focus on the strengths of African-American families in order to identify how, under the most adverse of
circumstances, so many had persevered. The consequence of this, as
William Julius Wilson argued later, was the failure of the academic research community to chronicle the considerable deterioration of AfricanAmerican institutions in urban areas during the period.27 Census data
indicate that ghettoization had increased significantly during the 1970s,
further isolating poor, urban African Americans from the American
mainstream:
26. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, THE NEGRO
FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965).
27.

WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 4 (1987).
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TRENDS IN SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF LARGE CENTRAL CITIES,
28
1980 (IN PERCENT)
Census Tracts with
20 Percent Poor

Indicator

Employment rate
males, age-16+
AFDC families
Black persons
Poor blacks

1970-

Census Tracts with
40 Percent Poor

1970

1980

% Change

1970

1980

% Change

63.3
19.8
27.2
28.3

56.0
28.0
26.5
30.5

-13
+40
-3
+8

56.5
30.2
6.3
9.4

46.0
42.0
8.3
13.1

-22
+40
+32
+40

While the number of AFDC families increased in census tracts that were
20% poor as well as those that were 40% poor, other social indicators of
ghettoization-the unemployment rate of young males, the number of
African Americans, and the number of African Americans in povertyhad worsened in the 40% poor tracts during the 1970s.
The direction the Reagan "revolution" was to take in welfare policy
was evident in the writings of conservative scholars of the early 1980s.
On the eve of the Reagan presidency, Martin Anderson of the Hoover
Institute claimed that "[t]he war on poverty has been won, except for
perhaps a few mopping-up operations. The combination of strong economic growth and a dramatic increase in government spending on welfare and income transfer programs for more than a decade has virtually
wiped out poverty in the United States."2 9 Taking a somewhat punitive
tack, George Gilder argued that social programs represented "moral
hazards," 30 protecting the poor from risks inherent in a market economy.
The poor, Gilder contended, did not need government welfare programs,
but "the spur of their [own] poverty" to improve their plight.3 1 Yet the
most telling analysis was to come from a previously obscure scholar,

Charles Murray, whose book, Losing Ground, was to become the conservative statement of the decade on welfare. Welfare programs had become so convoluted, concluded Murray, that the only solution consisted
of "scrapping the entire federal welfare and income support structure for
28. This chart was adapted from Sara McLanahan et al., Family Structure, Poverty, and
the Underclass, in URBAN CHANGE AND POVERTY 102, 130 (Michael G.H. McGeary &
Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr. eds., 1988).
29. Martin Anderson, Welfare Reform, in THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1980s 139, 145
(Peter Duignan & Alvin Rabushka eds., 1980).
30. GEORGE F. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 108 (1981). Gilder defines "moral hazard" as "the danger that a policy will encourage the behavior--or promote the disasters-that

it insures against." Id.
31. Id. at 118.
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working-aged persons, including AFDC, Medicaid, Food Stamps, Unemployment Insurance, Worker's Compensation, subsidized housing,
disability insurance, and the rest." 2 Consistent with the tone established

by conservative ideologues, the Reagan administration moved swiftly
against social programs.
Within seven months after assuming office, President Reagan
showed his hand on welfare by signing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. 33 OBRA proceeded on a dual track, cutting
public assistance benefits while at the same time combining categorical
programs into a Social Services Block Grant. The new AFDC eligibility
guidelines were particularly punitive since they were directed at poor
families who were participating in the labor force. Suddenly, AFDC
family heads who were trying to improve their economic lot found that
they could deduct only $160 per month per child for child care, that the
deduction for work expenses was limited to $75 per month, and that the
earned income disregard (the first $30 per month and one-third of income thereafter) was eliminated after four months.3 4 As if to strangle
the welfare bureaucracy in paperwork, OBRA required the welfare department to redetermine monthly the eligibility of those on AFDC who
insisted on working. These, among other measures, had an immediate
impact on the AFDC rolls: 408,000 families lost eligibility altogether,
and another 299,000 had their benefits reduced. 35 Federal and state governments realized savings of $1.1 billion in 1983.36 Significantly, OBRA
disentitled working poor families; five percent of the total AFDC
caseload became ineligible due to OBRA, and "about 35 percent of those
37
who were working were terminated by the legislation."
For most of the families AFDC ineligible by the OBRA provisions,
loss of benefits submerged them in poverty. Monthly income loss ranged
from $229 in Dallas to $115 in Boston.38 Former AFDC beneficiaries in
these cities had also lost Medicaid coverage. In Dallas, 59.2% of terminated families could not secure alternative health insurance; in Boston,
32. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 227-28 (1984).

33. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.A. to 50 U.S.C.A. (West 1987 & Supp. 1991)).
34. HOWARD KARGER & DAVID STOESZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN WELFARE
STATE 51 (1992).

35. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON
PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON VAYS AND MEANS 376
(1985) [hereinafter BACKGROUND MATERIAL].
36. Id.
37. Robert Mofitt &Douglas A. Wolf, The Effect of the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act on Welfare Recipients and Work Incentives, 61 SOC. SERV. REV. 247, 248 (1987).
38. BACKGROUND MATERIAL, supra note 35, at 377.
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27.5% could not.39 A study of AFDC families in Georgia found that
79% fell below the poverty level as a result of OBRA, compared to 70%
before 1981.' An investigation of the quality of life of 129 AFDC families in New Jersey that had lost benefits was Dickensian in its portrayal:
More than half the families were below the poverty level, 4 out
of 10 families did not have enough to eat, 2 out of 10 were
spending less than the amount required to provide a minimally
adequate diet, almost 3 out of 4 had problems paying rent and
utility bills, and most significantly, nearly 8 out of 10 families
had to forego or delay medical and/or dental care.4
Despite changes in tax policy which benefitted low-income workers,
particularly increased tax expenditures through the Earned Income Tax
Credit,4 2 the poor fared badly during the 1980s. The tax rebates given
the poor through tax policy failed to compensate for the losses of benefits
through welfare programs. "Low-income families, especially the working poor, lost appreciably more by cuts in government services than they
3
gained in tax reduction," admitted conservative analyst Kevin Phillips.1
And since the wealthy continued to benefit from less progressive taxation, the income disparity between rich and poor widened. Between 1980
and 1990, the federal tax burden for the richest quintile of tax-filers decreased 5.5%, while taxes of the poorest fifth increased 16.1%, despite

tax expendituresfor the poor.' Predictably, the rich gained a larger portion of the nation's income during the Reagan era.'
39. Id.
40. John S. Wodarski et al., Reagan'sAFDCPolicy Changes: The Georgia Experience, 31
SOC. WORK 273, 275 (1986).
41. Isabel Wolock et al., Forced Exit from Welfare" The Impact of FederalCutbacks on
Public Assistance Families, J. Soc. SERVICE RES., Winter 1985-Spring 1986, at 71, 94.
42. I.R.C. § 32 (1988).
43. KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLrrIcs OF RICH AND POOR 87 (1990).
44. ROBERT GREENSTEIN & SCOTT BARANCIK, DRIFTING APART 17 (1990).

45. Id. at 10. The table below illustrates the proposition:
CHANGE IN DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL U.S. AFrER-TAX INCOME,

1980-1990
Income Quintile
Richest fifth
Next richest fifth
Middle fifth
Next poorest fifth
Poorest fifth

1980

1990

44.8%
22.6
16.2
11.4
5.4

49.9%
21.7
14.9
9.9
4.3
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THE RISE OF THE UNDERCLASS

Upward redistribution of wealth was to be of substantial consequence for poor, urban African Americans. Increasingly reliant on public assistance programs that were not indexed for inflation, poor
minorities saw their benefits drop precipitously during the 1980s. Between 1972 and 1992 the value of AFDC benefits declined 43% due to
inflation. Combining benefits for Food Stamps and AFDC left the 1992
median benefit for an American family of three at $647 per month (28%
below the poverty level)." In 1983, the median worth of nonwhite and
Hispanic families was only $6,900, 12.7% of the median worth of white
families; but by 1989 it had fallen to $4,000, 6.8% of the median worth of
white families.4 7 By the late 1980s, the poverty rate of African Americans was three times that of whites.48
Compounding the erosion of income and assets, urban AfricanAmerican communities were further disadvantaged by the exodus of
middle-income African Americans to the suburbs and the replacement of
high-wage, manufacturing jobs with low-wage service jobs. The interaction of middle-class flight and technological transformation proved devastating for minorities residing in older industrial cities. For example,
the plight of young African Americans is immediately apparent if the
unemployment rate is combined with the labor force nonparticipation

rate, as shown below. By the mid-1980s young African-American males
were not participating to a significant extent in two primary institutions:
work and school. Compared to their white counterparts, young AfricanAmerican men were much more likely to be unemployed in every region
of the United States. But, if they were not working, neither were they in
school. This institutional alienation was to portend a rapid escalation of
drug-related street violence during the 1980s. Life circumstances of
young African-American males were particularly grim in the old industrial cities of the Northeast. In 1985, 68.0% of African-American young
men living in the Northeast were unemployed, not in school, or not
working, compared to 38.9% who lived in the West:
46. OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 18, at 637, 641.
47. Id. at 1449.
48. LAWRENCE MISHEL & DAVID FRANKEL, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 171
(1991).
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UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND PROPORTION OF MALE CENTRAL CITY
RESIDENTS AGE 16-24 WHO ARE NOT IN SCHOOL AND NOT IN THE
LABOR FORCE, BY RACE AND REGION, 198549

Region and Race
All regions
White
Black
Northeast
White
Black
Midwest
White
Black
South
White
Black
West
White
Black

Unemployment Rate

Percentage Not in School
and Not in Labor Force

13.5
37.1

6.1
14.1

16.7
43.5

9.4
24.5

19.1
44.5

7.1
not available

8.9
29.2

3.7
14.3

11.3
29.6

5.5
9.3

The consequences of such deterioration in opportunity are predictable enough. Many urban neighborhoods began to show characteristics
that were qualitatively different from-and more troubling than-than
those of communities that were simply poor. "What distinguishes mem-

bers of the underclass from those of other economically disadvantaged
groups," wrote William Julius Wilson, "is that their marginal economic
position or weak attachment to the labor force is uniquely reinforced by
the neighborhood or social milieu." 50 By the 1990s, areas of many industrial cities had virtually imploded.5 1 The "wilding" of New York teenagers who savagely beat a female jogger was replicated when a gang of
Boston youth raped and murdered a young mother.5 2 Gang killings in
Los Angeles soared by 69% during the first eight months of 1990."3
Gang-related murders in the nation's capital reached a three-year high,
49. See John D. Kasarda, Jobs, Migration, and Emerging Urban Milmatches, in URBAN
CHANGE AND POVERTY 148, 187 (Michael G.H. McGeary & Lawrence E. Lynn Jr. eds.,

1988).
50. William J. Wilson, PublicPolicy Research and THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, in THE
URBAN UNDERCLASS 460, 474 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).

51. Christopher Jencks, Deadly Neighborhoods, NEW REPUBLIC, June 13, 1988, at 23, 23;
Juan Williams, Hard Times, HarderHearts, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1988, at CI.
52. Eight Boston Teenagers Charged in Savage Slaying of Young Mother, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1990, at A-4.
53. Louis Sahagun, Gang Killings Increase 69%, Violent Crime Up 20% in L.A. County
Areas, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1990, at B-8.

1684

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

leading the police department's spokesperson to quip, "at the rate we're
going the next generation is going to be extinct." 4
Observers of urban poverty described a serious deterioration in inner-city communities of the 1980s contrasted with those of the 1960s.
When Claude Brown returned to Harlem twenty years after the publication of his Manchild in the PromisedLand," he was shocked by the casual viciousness of gang members toward their victims.5 6 "In many if not
most of our major cities, we are facing something very like social regression," wrote Daniel Patrick Moynihan.5 7 "It is defined by extraordinary
levels of self-destructive behavior, interpersonal violence, and social class
separation intensive in some groups, extensive in others." 8 In the socioeconomic vacuum that had developed in the poorest urban neighborhoods, the sale and consumption of drugs became central to community
life. The toll this conversion was to take on young African Americans
proved astonishing. As of 1988, 43% of those convicted of drug trafficking were African-American. In New York, Hispanics and African
Americans accounted for 92% of arrests for drug offenses in 1989. In
1990, a criminal justice reform organization, the Sentencing Project, reported that one-fourth of all African Americans between the ages of
twenty and twenty-nine were incarcerated, on parole, or on probation.
Harvard economist Richard Freeman calculated that 35% of all African
Americans aged sixteen to thirty-five had been arrested by 1989.19 Indeed, drugs had become so associated with poor minority neighborhoods
that it became a cause celebre among American intellectuals-evident in
Dennis Hopper's movie, Colors,6" and Richard Price's book, Clockers.61
In this context, the only change in poverty policy that was to emerge
during the 1980s, the Family Support Act of 1988,62 was largely ineffectual. Under the Family Support Act, $3.34 billion was to be allocated for
a five-year period to establish education and job-seeking opportunities54. Gabriel Escobar, Slayings in Washington Hit New High, 436, for 3rd Year, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1990, at A-26.
55. CLAUDE BROWN, MANCHILD IN THE PROMISED LAND (1965).
56. Claude Brown, Manchild in Harlem, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at
36.
57. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, CAME THE REVOLUTION 291 (1988).

58. Id.
59. Jonathan Marshall, Targeting the Drugs, Wounding the Cities, WASH. POST, May 2531, 1992, at 23 (Weekly Edition).
60. Stanley Kauffmann, Stanley Kauffmann on Films, in NEW REPUBLIC, May 15, 1988,
at 20, 20-21 (reviewing COLORS).
61. RICHARD PRICE, CLOCKERS (1992).
62. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified as amended at scattered sections
of 5, 26, & 42 U.S.C. (1988)).
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Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS)-for AFDC recipients. During 1990 and 1991, states would have to enroll at least 7% of AFDC
parents in workfare; by 1995, the required enrollment will rise to 20%.
Although two-parent families are covered by the act, beginning in 1997
one parent will be required to work at least sixteen hours a week in an
unpaid job in exchange for benefits.6 3 The more progressive provisions of
the bill included the extension of eligibility for day-care grants and Medicaid for one year after a client leaves AFDC for private employment.
The bill also mandated the automatic deduction of child support from an
absent parent's paycheck. The promised savings of workare soon faded,
however. Two years into the JOBS program, the Congressional Budget
Office projected that 10,000 families would be off AFDC by 1991, 20,000
by 1993, and 50,000 by end of the five years of the program-only a
1.3% reduction in the number of AFDC families. "The effect of the
JOBS program on the number of AFDC recipients or on spending on
benefits in welfare programs is thus expected to be modest," concluded
the House Ways and Means Committee." In a review of workfare
projects, Harvard's David Ellwood calculated increased earnings of $250
to $750 per year. According to Ellwood, "most work-welfare programs
look like decent investments, but no carefully evaluated work-welfare
programs have done more than put a tiny dent in the welfare caseloads,
even though they have been received with enthusiasm."65 By the early
1990s, studies conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research
Corporation (MDRC) cautioned against dramatic claims by workfare
advocates.6 6 Citing San Diego's Saturation Work Initiative Model
(SWIM) as typical of the mandatory workfare program required by the
Family Support Act, MDRC found that the average earnings by participants increased only $889 per year, representing savings in welfare payments of just $608 annually. 67 Thus, on the basis of either criterionincreased income or benefit savings-the workfare provisions of the
Family Support Act failed as a radical departure in welfare policy.
IV.

POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE POOR

Policy options to address the needs of disadvantaged African Americans have been proposed by liberals and conservatives alike. The plausi63. Spencer Rich, Panel Clears Welfare Bill, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1988, at A4.
64. OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 18, at 618.
65. DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 153
(1988).
66. JUDITH M. GUERON & EDWARD PAULY, FROM WELFARE TO WORK: SUMMARY
11-14 (1991).
67. Id. at 12.
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bility of new initiatives, however, has been constrained by the federal
budget deficit, as well as fiscal straits experienced by most states and
many local jurisdictions. Many states have chosen to reduce or eliminate
public assistance benefits in order to relieve budget pressures. By 1991,
fourteen states had reduced General Assistance benefits, the most dramatic example being Michigan's elimination of the program in October
1991, leaving approximately 82,000 beneficiaries without help to face the
winter.68 In addition, nine states cut AFDC benefits for 1991.69
Fiscal gridlock reached such an impasse by the early 1990s that liberal and conservative intellectuals in the nation's capital speculated about
a "new paradigm" for social policy.70 The unwillingness of the Bush administration to embrace the concept, coupled with suspicions of congressional Democrats, has left the idea in embryonic form. Consequently,
options in welfare policy have tended to follow the conservative and liberal cleavage that has defined the Republican and Democratic parties.
Conservatives have fielded enterprise zones, tax expenditures, and reciprocity of the poor71 as bases for welfare policy, while liberals have proposed child support enforcement, civic obligation, and development
accounts.
A.

EnterpriseZones

The enterprise zone concept can be traced to the Adam Smith Institute of England where researcher Stuart Butler elaborated the work of
others who promoted market strategies for community development.
Entrepreneurial activity could be promoted in poor areas, reasoned conservatives, by reducing taxes, employee expenses, and health and safety
regulations.72 Imported to the United States by the Heritage Founda68. ISAAC SHAPIRO ET AL., THE STATES AND THE POOR 21 (1991) (published jointly by
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and the Center for the Study of the States).
69. Id.
70. James Pinkerton and David Osborne have been the principal architects of the "new
paradigm." See DAVID OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY 11-13 (1988); James Pin-

kerton, Post-Modern Politics: The Search for a New Paradigm, Remarks to the Illinois New
Paradigm Society (September 16, 1991) (transcript on file with author). In October 1991, the
emerging consensus around a new paradigm for domestic policy led the Heritage Foundation
and the Progressive Foundation to co-sponsor a conference, "Left and Right," in Washington,
D.C. See LEFT AND RIGHT; THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW POLITICS IN THE 1990s? (1992)
(transcript of conference held Oct. 30, 1991, available from the Progressive Policy Institute).
For a critical examination of "new paradigm" thought, see MICKEY KAUS, Paradigm'sLost,
NEW REPUBLIC, July 27, 1992, at 16, 22.
71. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.

72. George Sternlieb, Kemp-Garcia Act: An Initial Evaluation,in NEw TooLs FOR EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE ENTERPRISE ZONE, DEVELOPMENT BANK, AND RFC 42, 42-

44, 48 (George Sternlieb & David Listokin eds., 1981).
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tion, Butler's ideas came to the attention of then-Congressman Jack
Kemp, who convinced the Reagan administration to make them the centerpiece of urban policy. Through the 1980s, Kemp's Urban Enterprise
Zone (UEZ) legislation stalled in Congress. Undaunted, the Heritage
Foundation promoted UEZs in states and localities; by mid-decade thirty
states and cities had created approximately three hundred UEZs.73 Local experimentation notwithstanding, the UEZ concept continued to languish until the Los Angeles riot propelled it to the center of the urban
policy debate in the spring of 1992. Despite the worst civil disturbance in
memory, UEZ provisions of the 1992 Urban Aid Act amounted to a
modest $2.5 billion for the creation of fifty enterprise zones. Unrelated
tax concessions added by the House and Senate increased appropriations
to $28 billion, an amount unacceptable to President Bush, who vetoed
the measure. 74
B. Earned Income Tax Credit
In 1975 Congress instituted the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),
whereby low-income taxpayers would be given a rebate from the Internal
Revenue Service. 7" Although the EITC was a negative income tax, for
conservatives it proved a suitable substitute for welfare; it was paid to
those who worked and it required beneficiaries to participate in the tax
system. In fact, during the 1980s and early 1990s-the period during
which direct public welfare expenditures for the poor were under assault-indirect payments under EITC actually increased substantially, as
shown below:
TOTAL AMOUNT OF EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT REBATES,
76

SELECTED YEARS

Year to Which Credit Applies

Total Amount (millions)

1975
1980
1985
1990
1991

$ 1,250
1,986
2,088
6,929
8,806

1992

10,697*

1993

11,914*

*projected
73. Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, HeritageFoundationDelivers the Right Message, BALTIMORE
SUN, Dec. 4, 1984, at IA, 8A.
74. Art Pine, President Vetoes Urban Aid Measure, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at A5.
75. OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 18, at 1013.
76. See id. at 1019.
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The rather remarkable growth of EITC tax expenditures suggests that it
has become a viable option for providing income security for the working
poor.
C. Reciprocity in Public Assistance
A staple of conservative thought on welfare throughout the Reagan
era was that welfare programs contributed to dependency and dysfunctional behaviors, especially when benefits were not conditioned on reciprocity or, in other words, a standard of conduct expected of recipients.
Lawrence Mead observed that "[t]he damage [by welfare programs]
seems to be done, not by the benefits, themselves, but by the fact that
they are entitlements, given regardless of the behavior of clients. They
raise the income of recipients, but, more important, free them to behave

without accountability to society."" Capitalizing on the workfare provisions of the Family Support Act, conservatives included a number of
other desirable behaviors as prerequisites to receipt of public assistance.
Recently, states have placed new requirements on the poor in order to
qualify for AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid. Wisconsin introduced
"learnfare," a program requiring beneficiaries to attend school or risk the
loss of benefits. In addition to requiring school attendance, Maryland
soon made it necessary for parents to assure that their children received
preventive health care. New Jersey thereafter denied additional assistance for children born after a grant has been awarded. Not to be outdone, Wisconsin introduced "wedfare," providing incentives for Moms
78
on AFDC to marry.
D. Child Support
That so many families on AFDC had outstanding child support orders on absent parents convinced many liberals that public assistance
could be enhanced by enforcing child support. Since 1975, child support
enforcement has been emphasized in the AFDC program; by 1991, $1.8
billion had been spent to collect $6.9 billion. 79 Enthusiasm about making
child support a primary feature of income support for poor women with
children led child welfare advocates to propose Child Support Assurance
(CSA)as welfare reform. Under the CSA proposal, child support would
essentially replace AFDC through three provisions: setting child support
77.

LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT 65 (1986).

78. See Elaine C. Kamarck, The Welfare Wars, NEW DEMOCRAT, July 1992, at 12, 1315. For a critique of "social engineering," see Innovations, New Directions,and New Convergences in Poverty Alleviation: Hearing before the Select Committee on Hunger, H.R., 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 39-48 (1992) (statement of Douglas J. Besharov).
79. OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 18, at 706.
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as a percentage of the absent parent's income; automatically withholding
child support from income, as has been done with Social Security taxes;
and assuring a minimum benefit to children if the absent parent defaults
on payments.8 0
E.

Civic Liberalism

Through the 1980s, social philosophers restated the importance of
the civic foundations of American culture.8" The implications of a civic
orientation for welfare policy received their most provocative treatment
by Mickey Kaus, a senior editor of The New Republic. In The End of
Equality, Kaus contrasts "money liberalism" with "civic liberalism,"
contending that the latter provides a more realistic basis for social policy.2 Given American antipathy for income redistribution as a goal of
public policy, Kaus argues that the creation of class-mixing situations
would be more plausible.8 3 The classes of American culture tend to diverge and fragment unless public programs are deliberately fashioned to
reintegrate them. Thus, Kaus favors a national service that would expose the affluent to circumstances of poorer fellow citizens; 4 but he also
suggests limits on welfare. Specifically, recipients of public assistance,
such as AFDC, would be offered income and training benefits for a fixed
period of two years after which, if private employment were not secured,
they would be required to accept a public works job or lose their
benefits.8 5
F.

Development Accounts

Recently, "stakeholding"-the substitution of assets for income
transfers through social policy-has become an option in poverty policy.
Pioneered by Michael Sherraden of Washington University, stakeholding
is advocated in response to the realization that the distribution of assets
is even more skewed than income, and that the poor can profit directly
from benefits that encourage savings and asset accumulation rather than
spending and income distribution. Accordingly, Sherraden has proposed
80. Irwin Garfinkel, Bringing FathersBack In: The Child Support .4ssuranceStrategy, 9
AM. PROSPECT 74, 75 (1992); David T. Ellwood, Child Support Enforcement and Insurance:

A Real Welfare Alternative, 9-10 (1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with David T. Ellwood at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University).
81. See, e.g., HARRY C. BOYTE, COMMONWEALTH: A RETURN TO CITIZEN POLITICS
156-57 (1989); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 226-27

(1982).
82. MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY 18 (1992).
83. Id. at 20-22.

84. Id. at 79-85.
85. Id. at 124-27.
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the creation of Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) to bolster assets for the working poor. IDAs would be designated for specific purposes: housing, postsecondary education, self-employment, and
retirement. The federal government would simply match IDA deposits
made by people in qualifying low-income families. The amount of the
federal supplement would vary with the importance of the activity-say
$5 in federal match to $1 saved for housing, or $2 in federal match to $1
saved for retirement.86 One such strategy-the Human Investment Pol-

icy for Oregon-is now in a planning
phase, having been approved by
87
that state's legislature and governor.
V.

THE PROSPECTS FOR URBAN AFRICAN AMERICANS

The election of Bill Clinton to the presidency offers a measure of
optimism for disadvantaged African Americans on what has been an
otherwise bleak landscape. Yet, it would be naive to be sanguine about
the prospect of significant improvement in their circumstances. Between
1980 and 1992 the number of AFDC recipients increased from approximately 10.6 million to 13.5 million while the purchasing power of benefits remained virtually static.88 Yet during the same period, federal aid to
the cities plummeted. From 1980 to 1992, urban aid through General
Revenue Sharing, Community Development Block Grants, Urban Development Action Grants, the Economic Development Administration,
Low-income housing, the Job Training Partnership Act (previously the
Comprehensive Employment Training Act), and the McKinney homeless assistance program fell from $41.4 billion to $16.9 billion.8 9 Clearly,
urban aid has not been a substitute for diminishing support for welfare
programs.
Short of a complete restructuring of welfare, which may be prohibitively expensive, 90 the best way to improve the lot of poor African Americans is through economic empowerment. As a result of reductions in
federal aid to cities during the 1980s, innovative social advocates began
experimenting with entrepreneurial strategies to help the minority poor.
Such endeavors as the Ford Foundation's Local Initiative Support Corporation, James Rouse's Enterprise Foundation, and the Mott Founda86. See
87.

MICHAEL SHERRADEN, ASSETS AND THE POOR

220-23 (1991).

STAFF OF OREGON HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE COMM., 65TH LEG-

ISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 2D SESS., OREGONIANS INVESTING IN OREGONIANS:

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

AN ECONOMIC

2 (Comm. Print 1990).

88. OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 18, at 660, 653.

89. Shari Rudavsky, Financially Taxed Cities Seek Help, WASH.
A21.
90. Stoesz & Karger, supra note 3, at 170-73.

POST,

July 9, 1992, at
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tion's microenterprise initiative generated an extensive list of successful
projects. 91 Among the most significant of such ventures are the Cooperative Home Care Associates of New York City, a worker-owned home
health agency that has employed many former-AFDC participants,9 2 and
Reach Inc., a $20 million network of nonprofit enterprises in Mississippi
and Alabama operated by African Americans, many of whom had been
dependent on public assistance. 93 Fulfilling the promise of these experiments will depend on the capacity of program advocates to integrate

public assistance and community development strategies in ways that effectively incorporate the diverse abilities and needs of poor African
Americans. While the details of such a plan have yet to be developed,
the rationale for an economic empowerment strategy was outlined more
than three decades ago by the Kerner Commission.

91. See

THE ASPEN INST.,

1992

DIRECTORY OF MICROENTERPRISE PROGRAMS (Mar-

garet Clark & Tracy Huston eds., 1992).
92. Jonathan Rowe, Up from the Bedside: A Co-op for Home Care Workers, 72 AM.
PROSPECT

88, 89 (1990).

93. William Claiborne, Mississippi Earning,WASH. PoST, Nov. 2-8, 1992, at 10 (Weekly

Edition).

